In the dialogue Socrates and Euthyphro discuss the nature of holiness, arriving finally at the well-known ( among philosophers and students of philosophy, anyway!) dilemma:
- Are things holy because they are loved by the gods?
- Or are things loved by the gods because they are holy?
Although Socrates and Euthyphro are discussing "holiness", the dilemma is extendable to other concepts, most commonly that of good:
- Is "good" that which is commanded by God?
- Or are things commanded by God because they are good?
But rather than solving the dilemma, this sort of brings us right back to it. Even in this more sophisticated version of DC, there would seem to be no epistemic difference between "God commands that which is good, based on his nature" and "God's commands are good." This is so because we have no independent means of verifying that God's commands reflect something external to His will (His nature) and thus, epistemically speaking, both versions are really equivalent.
There are certainly other means of grounding morality in God's nature, but the theist intent on paring this grounding with the certification of God's alleged commands as "good" regardless of any external verification would seem to have to deal with Euthyphro's dilemma.